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Introduction 
I. Saudi Religious Police Beat an Arrestee to Death Following a Raid 
 
On May 23, 2007, more than a dozen officers of Saudi Arabia’s religious 
police, The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (or 
simply, Haia) stormed into the Riyadh home suspected bootlegger Salman al-
Huraisi in search of illegal alcohol.1  They found large quantities of alcohol in 
the apartment.  They then proceeded to detain all members of the family within 
the house.  Huraisi was taken to a local station where he was severely beaten 
and left barely conscious. 2   The Haia officers called an ambulance when 
Huraisi started coughing up blood during one such beating and interrogation.  
Huraisi’s family was apparently present during the beatings.3  The autopsy 
revealed that the beatings caused his death. 4   When al-Huraisi’s father, 
Muhammad, age seventy-three, received the body for burial, he reported that 
“He was so badly beaten it was hard for us to recognize him.  There was a 
                                                     
1 Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia:  Hold Religious Police Accountable for Killing 
Human Rights Watch (Jul. 25, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/07/24/saudi-
arabia-hold-religious-police-accountable-killing; See also Raid Qusti, Vice Cops Change 
Testimony in Huraisi Retrial, Arab News (Apr. 9, 2008), 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/310793.  Saudi Arabia has three police forces, a regular 
police force, analogous to state troopers, a secret police, the General Investigation Directorate 
(Mabahith), analogous to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the religious police 
force, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.  
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Raid Qusti, Al-Huraisi Murder Trial Begins at Riyadh High Court, Arab News (Oct. 31, 
2007), http://www.arabnews.com/node/305122. 
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crack in his skull, his right eye was popped out, his jaw was broken…His 
mother could not absorb the entire thing and she fainted in the washroom.”5 
In addition to the homicide, the Haia agents violated multiple provisions 
of the Saudi Law of Criminal Procedure, including entering a private home 
without judicial authorization or a prosecutor-issued warrant, and detaining 
several women without either a male family member or neutral female escort 
present.6  
In the months that followed, Saudi Arabia’s Interior Ministry investigated 
the incident, detaining eight men involved.  The entire investigation and 
resulting trial appeared to have been a sham.  All Haia officers were cleared of 
all charges, and only one man was held responsible in al-Huraisi’s death.7  The 
man was a private citizen who accompanied the police on the raid – a 
volunteer.  The case was appealed, albeit with some resistance from the 
judiciary, including surprise vacations announced on the morning of which 
oral arguments were scheduled, in late 2008.  According to available 
information, the appeal is apparently still pending.8   
This case is illustrative of the current state of Saudi Arabia on several 
levels.  All levels of police appear to abuse their authority and do not appear to 
have ever been held liable for official misconduct.  Nevertheless, there appears 
                                                     
5 Raid Qusti, Family Members Bury Al-Huraisi in Riyadh, Arab News (Jul. 31, 2007), 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/301285. 
6  Law of Criminal Procedure, Arts. 2, 40, 41, 53.  
7 Raid Qusti, Commission Cleared in Huraisi Death, Arab News, (Jun. 26, 2007).  
http://www.arabnews.com/node/297170. 
8 Mansour al-Shehri, Commission Trial Cancelled, Judges on Vacation, Saudi Gazette,    
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=200804163393; 
See also Human Rights Watch, Award to Saudi Human Rights Lawyer, Human Rights Watch 
(Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/11/11/award-saudi-human-rights-lawyer. 
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to be enough resistance from the Saudi population that the monarchy is now 
pressing the police, albeit on a small level, to rein in on their excesses or be 
held accountable.9   
II. Statement of Purpose:  A Comparison of American and Saudi Search 
and Seizure Law and Practice 
 
The purpose of this paper is to prove that not only is the United States 
more protective of individual liberties than the constitution of Saudi Arabia 
(which will probably not surprise the reader), but to explain exactly why this is 
so. This paper will investigate each country’s search and seizure rules, their 
laws will be examined and compared along the following lines:  historical basis 
for current law, the current rules governing searches and seizures of persons 
and property, whether law enforcement must obtain prior authorization to 
conduct a search or to seize evidence, and the process for doing so, exceptions 
to the general rules, limitations on the manner and scope of judicially 
authorized searches or seizures, remedies or sanctions for violations of the 
rules and their exceptions, and how well existing laws are followed in practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 Contrast the above case with one that occurred earlier this year, where the head of the 
Haia, Sheikh Abdul Latif Abdul Aziz al-Sheigh appeared at the funeral of a man killed in a car 
chase with his agents and consoled the grieving father, claiming that “he was [t]here to fulfill 
his duty.”  Al Arabiya, They were Innocent:  Saudis React to Religious Police Car-Chase Death, 
Al-Arabiya (Sept, 29, 2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/29/-
They-were-innocent-Saudi-Arabia-reacts-to-religious-police-car-chase-deaths.html. 
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Saudi Law:  A Modern Interpretation of 
Medieval Law 
 
Saudi Arabia’s closest analogue to a constitution is the monarchy’s 
statement of “Basic Law,” published on March 1, 1992.  Article One of the basic 
law states that  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab 
Islamic State.  Its religion is Islam.  Its constitution is 
Almighty God’s Book, The Holy Qur’an, and the Sunna 
(Traditions) of the Prophet (PHUB).  Arabic is the 
Language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the 
capital. 
 
The Basic Law of Governance, art. I.10  The basic law states clearly that the 
constitution consists of scripture and prophetic tradition.  Included within this 
definition is a traditional religious law, Sharia, which functions as the default 
criminal law in Saudi Arabia, albeit without actually being codified as such.11  
While the Saudi monarchy does pass statutes to cover new problems as they 
arise, such as modern drug trafficking, much of its criminal law and procedure 
follows centuries old tradition.12   
                                                     
10 Basic Law of Governance, art. 1.  Art. 7 further emphasizes that “…the Book of God 
and the Sunna of the Prophet…are the ultimate sources of reference for this law and the other 
laws of the state.  
11 Rudolph Peters, Crime and punishment in Islamic Law:  Theory and Practice form the 
Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 148 (2009).  
12 English text of the narcotics statutes and regulations are not easily obtainable.  
Summaries of the statutes may be found at the Saudi Ministry of the Interior website:  Ministry 
of Interior, General Director of Narcotics Control, Penalties,   
https://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/narcoticscontrol/!ut/p/b1/04_SjzQ0MzMzNzaztDDRj9CP
ykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOLd_cKCjd09jA0NXM2cDTwDTT38vU1DDbyDzfSDU_P0c6McFQHOY
XNI/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/narcotics+control/narcotics+control/pen
alties/&WCM_Parent_Path=/narcotics+control/narcotics+control/penalties.   
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In order to understand modern Saudi search and seizure procedure, it 
will therefore be helpful to investigate how the Quran and Sunna treat the 
topic.  The following sections will examine the scriptural basis for Islamic 
search and seizure rules and then explain how they were subsequently 
interpreted.    
As a preliminary note, the Quran provided for the establishment of 
religious police.  The verses state:  “Let there arise out of you a band of people 
inviting all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is 
wrong…”13  They were referred to as muhtasib, and had the duty of walking the 
streets to enforce religious provisions, such as prohibitions on drinking and 
owning or playing musical instruments.14  In later centuries when the Muslim 
state grew and split, they worked alongside and in addition to state-employed 
police.  They Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice is a 
continuation of this old institution.   
  
                                                     
13 Quran 3:104.   
14 Sadiq Reza, Islam’s Fourth Amendment:  Search and Seizure in Islamic Doctrine and 
Muslim Practice, 40 Georgetown journal of International Law, 703, 732-33 (2009).  
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I. Scripture and Tradition as the Starting Point for Search and Seizure 
Law.  
 
A. Searches:  A General Protection of Private Homes 
 The starting point for search rules comes from the following verses:   
O you who have believed, do not enter houses other 
than your own houses until you ascertain welcome 
and greet their inhabitants.  That is best for you; 
perhaps you will be reminded.  And if you do not find 
anyone therein, do not enter until permission has been 
given you. And if it is said to you, “Go back,” then go 
back; it is purer for you.  And Allah is Knowing of what 
you do.” 15   
 
 The scriptural source for search rules comes from another passage:   
O you who have believed, avoid much [negative] 
assumption.  Indeed, some assumption is sin.  And do 
not spy or backbite each other.  Would one of you like 
to eat the flesh of his brother when dead? You would 
detest it. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is accepting of 
repentance and merciful. 16 
 
 One last verse prescribes a final search rule:  “…It is not righteous to 
enter houses from the back, but righteousness is in one who fears Allah.  And 
enter houses from their doors.  And fear Allah that you may succeed.”17  This is 
essentially an extension on the prior two commandments, and commands 
readers not to sneak in the back door of a building.   
 Two of the three verses are directed toward all believers, and so 
presumably apply to all Muslims, including state actors.  Collectively, these 
                                                     
15 Qur’an, 24:27-28.  Translation taken from the following source:  
http://quran.com/24/27-28 
16 Qur’an 49:12.  Translation:  http://quran.com/49/12.  The word “assumption” is 
sometimes replaced by the word “suspicion” in other translations.    
17 Qur’an 2:189. Translation:  http://quran.com/2/189 
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verses prescribe three rules:  (1) Muslims should not enter the homes of other 
Muslims, whether empty or not, without permission, (2) Muslims should not 
spy on one another, and (3) if Muslims do enter others believers’ homes, they 
should use the main entrance.  
Some sayings of Muhammad have been passed down through tradition 
to elaborate on these rules, but they were primarily developed by his 
companions and successors.18  Several stories of the second Muslim ruler, 
Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab served as examples for the formation of Muslim 
law and criminal procedure.  In one such story, Umar and a companion were 
wandering around Mecca late at night.  They came across a home with loud 
sounds coming from inside.  Umar and his companion concluded that the 
people inside were drinking, which is contrary to Muslim law.  Nevertheless, 
Umar left without bothering the party inside, concluding that he had learned of 
the drinking through spying.19  On another occasion, Umar was informed that 
a man was drinking wine.  He went to the man’s house and climbed over the 
wall without permission to find him drinking.  The homeowner persuaded 
Umar to leave without inflicting any penalty, since Umar had entered the house 
without permission to investigate, which was equated with spying.20  These two 
                                                     
18 For example, Muhammad was said to have established a specific procedure for 
seeking permission to enter a home and would not look through open doors before receiving 
permission to enter.  III Sunan Abu Da’ud 1429, nos. 5158, 5167.   He also threatened to stab 
a man through the eye who spied on him inside his home without permission. VIII Sahih 
Bukhari 8, no. 258.  
19 Reza, supra note 4, at 724.  Citing Abd Al-Qadir, 1 Tashri’ Al-Jina’I Al-Islami 220, 
503 (1963).  
20 Id. citing Abdul Latif Al-Humayyim, Ihtiram Al-Hayah Al-Khassah (“Al-Khususiyyah”) 
Fi Alshariah Al-Islamiyyah Wa Al-Qanun Al-Muqaran (2004), 174.  See also A. Q. Shaheed, 
Criminal Law of Islam, 217-18(S. Zakir Aijas trans., 2005).  
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stories suggest that otherwise guilty parties may be able to either suppress 
evidence or avoid charges if authority figures violate the law in the process of 
uncovering wrongdoing.   
 Another story ended differently.  A woman was suspected of committing 
adultery.  Four men hid inside the house and surprised the woman and her 
partner when they came inside.  Despite violating the prohibitions on home 
entry and spying, Umar nevertheless allowed their testimony into evidence 
against the man and woman.  The four men were still punished for their 
wrongdoing.21  In this case the ruler, Umar, did not suppress the evidence 
(which by itself was insufficient evidence to prove adultery), and was willing to 
punish both parties for their respective wrongdoing.  There is some dispute 
among sources, but it is arguable that there may have been an analogue to the 
American exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence in early Islamic law.   
  
                                                     
21 Id. at 727-28.   
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B. Seizures:  Strong Evidentiary Requirements 
 
 Early traditions also prescribe procedures for judicial restraint and 
oversight of pre-adjudication seizure of persons.  Under these traditions, 
persons could not be thrown in prison without being given an opportunity to 
defend themselves in open court.22   Detentions could be made, but only for 
good reason.  If the arresting party could not provide compelling justification to 
the court for detention, then the prisoner would be released.23  Evidence – 
generally eyewitnesses – was necessary to justify detention, and detention 
could be no longer than is necessary to determine whether further prosecution 
is appropriate.24   Umar, for example, refused to seize a suspected thief without 
a witness:  
I set out with some riders and, when we arrived at Dhii 
al Marwah, one of my garment bags was stolen. There 
was one man among us whom we thought suspicious. 
So my companions said to him: "Hey, you, give him 
back his bag". But the man answered: "I didn't take it." 
When I returned, I went to 'Umar ibn al Khattrb and 
told him what had happened. He asked me how many 
we had been, so I told him [who had been there]. I also 
said to him: "Amir al Mu'minin, I wanted to bring the 
man back in chains". 'Umar replied: "You would bring 
him here in chains, and yet there was no witness? I 
will not recompense you for your loss, nor will I make 
inquiries about it". 'Umar became very upset. He never 
recompensed me nor did he make any inquiries.25 
 
Without some evidentiary basis beyond the fact of accusation, suspected 
wrongdoers could not be detained or even charged with an offense.   
                                                     
22 Abul A’la Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam 25 (1977).  
23 Id.  
24 Taha J. al-Alwani, Rights of the Accused (Part Two), 10 Arab. L. W., 234, 242.  
25 Id. at 242-43, citing Abd al Razzdq, al Musannaf, vol. 10, p. 193. 
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 These stories, along with the above scriptural verses, are the starting 
point for Islamic search and seizure law, at least so far as Sharia law is 
concerned.  They serve as the foundation for later jurists whose doctrines 
would form much of the body of Sharia law and procedure.26   
II. Medieval Jurisprudence:  Reinterpreting Personal Law in Following 
the Formation of a Centralized State Government.  
 
 Muslim scholars reinterpreted and expanded upon the Quran verses and 
tradition stories during the middle ages.  For example, search rules could be 
applied differently depending upon who is doing the searching – they might be 
more relaxed for state actors, particularly those with a high level of authority.  
This is reflected in modern Saudi criminal practice, which has procedures for 
obtaining search warrants.27  The development of differing rules for private and 
state actors reflects that early Islamic law was designed to deal with disputes 
between private persons, rather than between the state and an individual, as 
well as the fact that private citizens could serve as a type of religious police, 
and bring others to court for committing offenses.28   
 Mawardi, a political theorist and leading judge in eleventh century 
Baghdad held state actors to a different standard than muhtasib, or the Sharia 
                                                     
26 While many crimes are traditional, five, at least, are found in scripture.  The crimes 
and evidence required for conviction are highly specific. Nevertheless, some, like theft and 
highway robbery, have been extensively modified and expanded in modern Saudi Arabia.  
These are (1) zina, or adultery, (2) qadf, or wrongful accusation of adultery, 3 shrub al-khamr, 
or drinking alcohol, 4 sariqa, or theft, and (5) qat al-tariq, or highway robbery. Other offenses, 
such as insurrection, apostacy, homicide, and bodily injury have also been recognized since 
the first Muslim state.  Wael B. Hallaq, Sharia:  Theory, Practice, Transformations 310-22 
(2009). 
27 Law of Criminal Procedure, Art. 41, Royal Decree No. (M/39) (2001).  
28 Hallaq, supra note 16 at 308-09. See also Reza, supra at note 4, 732-33. Muhtasib 
could be either state actors or private citizens.  
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courts – the state’s law enforcement powers exceeded those of volunteer 
muhtasib and the ordinary Sharia courts, the qadi.29  Local magistrates (“amir”) 
could conduct spying, order pre-adjudicative detention, and even require that 
prisoners submit bail as a condition of release.  Magistrates can have prisoners 
beaten to force confessions, although forced confessions should not be used as 
a basis for punishment.  
A. Search:  Exceptions to the Sanctity of Private Homes 
Multiple exceptions developed to the general prohibition on police 
entering homes.  Entering a home was forbidden unless:  (1) the wrongdoing 
traveled outside the home onto the street, (2) or when there was evidence that 
the home’s inhabitants had committed wrongdoing on prior occasions (because 
the sinner’s bad reputation essentially rendered the bad conduct public).30  (3) 
Necessity, such as to put out a fire, was another excuse, (4) as was entry to 
search for a wanted criminal.31 
The prevention on spying was similarly modified.  Not all spying was 
contrary to God’s command:  “what distinguishes the kind of suspicion that 
must be avoided from all other kinds of suspicion is that the kind of suspicion 
for which no proof or apparent reason is known must be avoided.”32  This 
                                                     
29  Abu'l-Hasan 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Habib al-Basri al-Baghdadi al-Mawardi, The 
Ordinances of Government 309-11 (Trans. Asadullah Yate). 
30 Eli Alshech, “Do Not Enter Houses Other than your Own”: The Evolution of the Notion of 
a Private Domestic Sphere in Early Islamic Thought, 11 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 291, 298–300 
(2004), citing Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, 14 al-Nawadir wa’l-ziyadat ‘ala ma fial-Mudawwana  
316 (1999).  
31 Reza, supra at note 4, 731.  
32 Taha J. al-Alwani, Rights of the Accused (Part One), 10 Arab. L. W., 3, 14. 
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meant that surveillance, eavesdropping, and searches could be justified if there 
was enough pre-existing suspicion.   
The threshold for justifiable surveillance and search varied between the 
medieval schools of law.  The scholar Hanbal, for example, whose thought  
forms the basis for the modern Saudi legal system, told his followers to not 
even attempt locating a house in which forbidden music was being played, even 
if the music could be heard from the street, because “what is covered [by the 
house] one [should] not search.33   The early Hanbalite School of law thus 
appeared to have offered protection against spying and searches of private 
homes even if the criminal conduct was apparent from public spaces.  The 
Hanbalis would not allow search of a house unless police inadvertently came 
across an offense, and if it was immediately apparent without further search.34  
If wrongdoing or evidence was out in the open and immediately apparent, then 
there was no spying in the first place.35  Under this view, police could destroy 
any contraband or try to stop any wrongdoing that they encountered in 
public.36  Furthermore, if religious police had evidence or sufficient reason to 
believe that a closed container or other personal effect contained contraband, 
the contraband’s presence and nature was clear and the religious police could 
seize and destroy it.37 
                                                     
33 Eli Alscheck, “Do Not Enter Houses other than Your Own”:  The Evolution of the Notion 
of a Private Domestic Sphere in Early Islamic Thought, 11 Islamic L. & Soc’y, 291, 300 (2004), 
citing 2 Abd Allah b. Ahmad B. Hanbal 293 (1981).  
34 Id. at 301.  
35 Reza, supra at note 4, 732. 
36 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought 100 
(2001).  
37 Id.  
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Surveillance and search rules were different outside the home.  When in 
public places, muhtasib were allowed to make inferences based on their 
observations and intuition.  For example, if a muhtasib encountered a person 
on the street with a musical instrument partially sticking out of their pocket or 
the smell of alcohol on their breath, the muhtasib could confiscate the 
instrument or investigate further to see whether the suspect had been 
drinking.  This bears some resemblance to the American Terry standard, which 
allows police to search suspects based on reasonable suspicion of criminal 
conduct.  
B. Criteria for Arrest:  Personal Reputation and Seizure 
Under the eleventh century jurist Mawardi’s political theory, secular law 
enforcement existed and operated parallel to religious law enforcement – 
muhtasib and the qadi courts.  Secular law enforcement had greater arrest 
powers than religious law enforcement, which were restricted by sharia’s 
limitations on investigation and preventative detention.  Secular law 
enforcement were not subject to the same rules.  A governor’s agents could 
seize a person upon mere accusation of a crime and jail them pending 
investigation into guilt or innocence. 38   The length of such preventative 
detention appears to have varied based on the opinion of local rulers and the 
facts of each case. 39   Not every medieval writer advocated having a dual 
                                                     
38 Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System:  Studies of Saudi Arabia 234 (2004). 
39 Id.  
David Cicotte 
dcicott@gmail.com 
15 
 
criminal justice system, but Mawardi’s writings may have reflected actual 
practice in eleventh century Mesopotamia.40  
Relevant factors for deciding whether to arrest and jail a person pending 
trial included:  (1) the gravity of the alleged crime, (2) quality and quantity of 
evidence, with special concern for eyewitnesses, (3) and the accused’s personal 
reputation.41  Crime seriousness was relevant more because of flight risk than 
out of any concern for public safety or concern about revenge from a victim’s 
family – serious offenses tended to carry harsher sentences and law 
enforcement did not want suspects to flee during an ongoing investigation or 
before trial.  The concern for number and quality of witnesses is easily 
explained, in that witness testimony was the primary means of evidence in an 
era before modern forensics – without witnesses it would not be possible to 
prove who committed an offense.  In addition, the set religious crimes, hadad 
all required testimony from multiple witnesses.  As for reputation, it could fall 
into one of three categories:  (a) a person could be well known in a community 
as a good, hard-working and pious person, (b) could be publicly known as lazy, 
sinful, or as a criminal, and (c) or have an unknown reputation, or anything 
between the two extremes.  Accused persons in the first category would 
probably not be detained or beaten, since law enforcement could be confident 
that they would be honest enough to submit to judgment.  The second category 
would be detained, beaten, and forced to confess to the crime – their bad 
                                                     
40 The dual criminal system continued in practice at least through the thirteenth and 
into the fourteenth century according to the medieval north African jurist ibn Khaldun.  Abd al 
Rahman bin Muhammed ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, 294 (Franz Rosenthal trans.1969).  
41 Reza, supra at note 4, 754-55. 
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reputation meant that they were likely guilty and a flight risk.  Persons in the 
third category would be detained until law enforcement could learn enough 
about them to decide whether to release or detain them pending further 
investigation and trial.  
Detention could take the form of imprisonment but did not always do so.  
A person could also be placed under house arrest, deposit a surety bond, or 
obtain personal surety from a third party who would personally assume 
responsibility for producing them later at court.42  Again, relevant factors in 
determining whether to imprison a person pending investigation included the 
gravity of the crime, flight risk, and the accused’s reputation.   
  
                                                     
42 Id. citing Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyah, Al-Turuq Al-Hukmiya Fi Al-Siyasah Al-Shar‘Iyah 
[Procedures Of Administration] 89–92 (2002). 
David Cicotte 
dcicott@gmail.com 
17 
 
III. Current Saudi Law:  The Practice of Extreme Judicial Discretion 
Saudi Arabia, as stated in Article I of the monarchy’s Basic Law, tries to 
follow sharia traditions as closely as possible, and comes closer to doing so 
than any other country in the world.  Except for a few ethnic minorities, the 
vast majority of courts subscribe to the Hanbalite school of law.  Hanbalites do 
not subscribe to the view of binding precedents.43  Instead, Saudi judges use 
their own legal reasoning, and derive appropriate rulings on a case-by-case 
basis.  Hanbalites use only the following as legal resources:  Qur’an, Hadith 
(traditional sayings of Muhammad), historic consensus of Muhammad’s 
companions, and legal analogy.44  There is no analogue to stare decisis in 
Saudi Arabia and appeals court decisions apply only to individual cases.  As a 
result, both verdicts and sentences are unpredictable and can vary widely even 
with cases that have similar fact patterns.  Judges are able to exercise extreme 
discretion, provided only that their rulings do not blatantly contradict Islamic 
scripture or tradition.  Given the lack of codified laws and extreme judicial 
discretion, lawyers have little power in court and are less useful than in the 
United States.  
  
                                                     
43 Precarious Justice, 20 Human Rights Watch 12-13 (March 2008).  
44 Muhammad Sa’Ad Al-Rasheed, Criminal Procedure in Saudi Judicial Institutions 23 
(1973) (published thesis, Durham University) (Available at Durham E-Theses Online:  
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1857/).  
David Cicotte 
dcicott@gmail.com 
18 
 
A. Modernizing the Law:  Movement to Codify Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Law in Order to Limit Judicial Discretion and 
Provide for Predictable Verdicts.  
 
The Saudi Monarchy, at least in theory, has been attempting to limit 
judicial discretion and introduce predictability into criminal law and procedure 
for the last two decades.  In 1990, King Fahd attempted to codify rules of 
procedure for sharia courts, but quickly retracted it due to judicial outcry.45  
The monarchy reissued the rules of court procedure in 2000, and codified 
Saudi Arabia’s first rule of criminal procedure in 2002.46  Under the criminal 
procedure law searches are prohibited without force of law.  Homes are 
specially protected and may not be searched without a warrant (although 
warrants are issued by investigators, rather than the judiciary).47  Searches are 
limited in scope to the crime for which the subject is accused and homes may 
not be searched unless the owner or an adult family member is present.48  In 
order to enforce these rules, the criminal procedure requires that records be 
kept of each warrant search, including the text of the warrant, the date, time, 
and location of the search, a description of the items seized, and the signature 
of the home’s owner or witnesses.49  Arrestees must be informed of the reason 
for their arrest and be given an opportunity to inform family members of their 
detention. 50   There are procedures to prevent excessively long pretrial 
detention, although these are relatively simple to overcome under 
                                                     
45 Human Rights Watch, supra at note 43, 22. 
46 Id. 
47 Law of Criminal Procedure, Arts. 2, 40, 41. 122. 
48 Id. Arts. 45-46.  
49 Id. Art. 47.  
50 Id. Art. 35.  
David Cicotte 
dcicott@gmail.com 
19 
 
administrative processes within the criminal procedure code.51  Arrestees may 
not be physically harmed, meaning, in theory, that police cannot beat 
confessions out of arrestees.52  Finally, accused persons have a right to the 
assistance of a lawyer during preliminary police investigation and trial.53  
There is also some pressure among Saudi intellectuals to codify parts of 
the sharia into a substantive criminal law.  Sheikh Abdullah Al-Mani, a 
member of Saudi Arabia’s Council of Senior Scholars (the highest religious 
body in Saudi Arabia), stated in an interview with the newspaper Asharq Al-
Awsat that  
I have been calling for [codifying the law] for over 25 
years. I called for codification according to the four 
schools of thought, not only the Hanbali School. If an 
official party took on this responsibility it would 
undoubtedly reduce differences and would constitute a 
strong factor in hastening the verdict in judicial 
proceedings. It would also make rulings much clearer 
for litigants before going to court. I would like to 
emphasize that codification would be one way of 
judicial reform in Saudi Arabia.54 
 
And in 2007, the monarchy proclaimed that it would over the following years 
reinvest in and reorganize the country’s judicial system, which would create 
specialized commercial, labor, and administrative courts.55 
                                                     
51 Id. Arts. 109, 113, 114.  
52 Id. Art. 35.  
53 Id. Art. 4.  
54 Interview with Saudi Conucil of Senior Ulama Member Sheikh Abdullah Al Manee, 
Asharq al-Awsat (March 23, 2006). Available at: 
http://www.aawsat.net/2006/03/article55267381.  It is worth noting, that when asked if 
penal law should be codified, he responded somewhat vaguely that “The law cannot be 
changed, manipulated, or reinterpreted.” 
55 Esther van Eijk, Sharia and National Law in Saudi Arabia, reprinted in Sharia 
Incorporated:  A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in 
Past and Present 149-50  (Michiel Otto ed. 2010).  
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B. Saudi Practice:  Police Ignore the Rules 
These legal reforms have had little practical effect.  Saudi residents are 
often not aware of what their rights are or that they even have rights to begin 
with.  Detainees must know their rights and insist that they be followed.56  
Police and prison officials are not familiar with criminal procedure standards, 
and even “judges are not very conversant in the criminal procedure code.”57   
The Haia in particular does not observe the Law of Criminal procedure 
when arresting.  Agents can enter homes without warrants if they learn that a 
crime is in progress and police do not inform persons of their crimes upon 
arrest. 58  Arbitrary arrests are also common:  grounds for arrest can include 
those such as “doubting the approach of the ruler and the present entity of the 
state based on the application of the Book and the Sunna…and of doubting the 
independence of the judiciary, and of deceiving the people.”59   Police often 
detain people without charges or access to legal counsel, and foreign detainees 
often have little or delayed consular access if involved in a criminal case.60 
  
                                                     
56 Human Rights Watch, supra at note 43, 18.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 9 and 59. 
59 Id. at 57.  
60 United States Department of State, Saudi Arabia Country Specific Information, (Oct. 
21, 2013, 4:44 PM), http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1012.html#country. 
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United States Law:  Fourth Amendment 
Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches 
  
The United States, unlike Saudi Arabia, has a textual constitution which 
functions, at least in the area of search and seizure, as a general statement of 
policy.  Specific interpretation of constitutional text falls to individual courts.  
Criminal defendants (only) may appeal a trial court’s ruling, potentially 
multiple times.  The United States Supreme Court is the court of last resort.  
Its rulings serve to define a floor for permissible search and seizure practices.  
All other levels of federal and state court are bound to follow constitutional 
interpretations set by the United States Supreme Court.  Furthermore, all 
lower courts are bound by appellate court rulings within their respective 
jurisdiction, and individual courts tend to follow previous rulings unless there 
is a compelling reason to the contrary (a common law concept referred to as 
stare decisis – let it stand).  Stare decisis allows for consistent and predictable 
rulings across cases with similar sets of facts, while still allowing higher level 
courts enough discretion to modify the law when either justice requires, or 
when a court reinterprets a constitutional provision.  
Since the federal constitution mentions both search and seizure 
explicitly, the starting point in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is the text of 
the constitution itself.  The Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
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supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.61 
 
The Fourth Amendment creates two rules:  searches must be reasonable and 
warrants require probable cause, supported by police assurances, and a 
description of the areas to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.  
The precise nature of these two rules – especially the one prohibiting 
unreasonable searches – have varied both over time and with the facts of 
different cases.  This section will start with a brief history of United States 
search and seizure law, proceed to current law, examine current cultural 
concerns, and then proceed to a sample case to illustrate how well police follow 
the law, and what consequences may occur when they do not.   
  
                                                     
61 U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
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I. Fourth Amendment as Protection of Property, Not Persons 
Until 1967, the Supreme Court determined the bounds of police search 
and seizure by use of the criminal trespass doctrine.  If police, without a 
warrant (i) intruded (ii) on a protected area of private property (iii) to obtain 
information, then any information learned thereby was obtained illegally and 
may have been suppressible at trial.  For example, in Silverman v. United 
States, the Justice Stewart wrote that “eavesdropping accomplished by means 
of such a physical intrusion [wa]s beyond the pale.62   In that case, police 
passed a microphone through a heating duct to listen in on a conversation 
without the speakers’ consent or knowledge.  The court ruled that the police 
practice here was “an actual intrusion on a constitutionally protected area.”63  
This older rule measured Fourth Amendment privacy concerns in terms of 
property, rather than personal rights.  The trespass doctrine was not 
concerned so much with privacy in and of itself or privacy in a personal sense 
as it was with privacy in private property – especially the home.  The trespass 
doctrine reflected early American preoccupation, particularly among the social 
elites of the revolutionary and industrial eras, with government infringement 
upon private property.  I mention the trespass standard because it was recently 
resurrected in United States v. Jones. It is not yet clear how closely lower 
                                                     
62 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961). The trespass doctrine 
originated at the Supreme Court level in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  
63 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512. 
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courts (or the Supreme Court) will follow this ruling, so its consequences 
cannot yet be predicted.64   
II. Current Law:  Fourth Amendment Protection of Persons, Rather 
Than Property 
 
A. Social Privacy Expectations as the Basis for Reasonableness 
Since 1967, rules surrounding reasonable searches have turned on 
personal and social privacy expectations.  In Katz v. United States, the Court 
explicitly departed from the earlier property-based test.  Justice Stewart wrote 
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people – and not simply ‘areas’ – against 
unreasonable searches and seizures…the reach of that Amendment cannot 
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given 
enclosure.”65  Justice Harlan’s concurrence was later adopted by the Supreme 
Court to define the bounds  of what are and are not reasonable searches – ‘a 
person must both have exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy 
and, that expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.’66  A person can demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy by 
taking precautions to ensure that their words and actions are not public – in 
Katz, shutting the door of an otherwise public telephone booth was sufficient to 
show a personal privacy expectation.  The second prong of the test proves more 
problematic.  The Court tends to base public willingness to recognize privacy 
interests based upon the reasoning of a majority of the court.  The Supreme 
Court over the last twenty five years has created such a high bar for 
                                                     
64 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).  
65 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).  
66 Id. at 361.  
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‘reasonable’ privacy expectations – for example homeowners must literally wall 
and roof their back yards in order to constitutionally shield the area from 
police view.67  Such a rule is clearly absurd on its face.  If homeowners thought 
that aerial shielding was necessary to ensure privacy of their yards, more 
would enclose such spaces with roofs or tarps.  This is not a common practice, 
while five to eight foot high fences are relatively common.  This lack of overhead 
shielding shows that that homeowners expect their yards will typically be 
private from aerial surveillance.  As a general rule in the last thirty-five years, 
the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to find the vast majority of police 
search practices reasonable.  
B. Seizures:  Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements 
All seizures must follow the reasonableness standard.  Seizures may be 
of either a person or of property.  Arrests are reasonable if the police (i) see a 
person in the process of committing a crime, (ii) have probable cause to believe 
that the person currently is committing or has committed a crime, or (iii) if they 
have a warrant for a person’s arrest.68  Unlike in Saudi Arabia, United States 
arrest warrants do not expire with passage of time.  Police may seize two types 
of property:  evidence of a crime and contraband, which is property for which 
the state has criminalized all possession.  Police may seize such property if (i) it 
is in plain view, (ii) if the property’s owner consents to a search, (iii) if they 
come across it during an otherwise lawful search, (iv) or if they have a valid 
                                                     
67 California v. Ciraolo, 576 U.S. 207 (1986).  
68 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).  
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warrant to seize the property.  Warrants for searches and seizures of property 
can go stale over time and eventually become invalid.69 
C. Constitutional Requirements for a Valid Warrant 
 If a warrant is valid, all searches and seizures pursuant to the warrant 
are presumptively reasonable.  In order for warrants to be valid, (i) the issuing 
party must be a neutral magistrate.  They do not have to be educated in the 
law, but generally are lawyers.70  For a magistrate to be neutral, they must not 
be compensated for issuing warrants or show overt partiality toward law 
enforcement.71 (ii) Police must present probable cause to the magistrate either 
that an individual is committing or has committed a crime, or that evidence of 
a crime is or will soon be at a specific location.  Evidence or persons to be 
seized must be described with particularity, although this requirement is a low 
bar.  A simple list, ending with a phrase like ‘all other evidence of X crime’ will 
suffice.72   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
69 Whether a warrant has gone stale is generally left to the trial court’s discretion, 
although appellate courts or even police themselves (however unlikely this may be) could 
potentially declare a warrant stale.   
70 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972). 
71 Connally v. Georgia, 44 U.S. 245 (1977). 
72 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 464 (1976).  
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D. Warrant Exceptions:  When Police May Constitutionally and 
Reasonably Search Persons or Property Without a Warrant.  
 
 While warrants are presumptively required to legitimate a search and 
some seizures, there are eight exceptions to the warrant requirement:  consent, 
plain view, exigent circumstances, search incident to arrest, inventory 
searches, automobile searches, suspicion searches, and special needs 
searches.  
 Consent and plain view are different from the others in that the Fourth 
Amendment is not even implicated.  In a consent search, the actual or 
apparent property owner willingly gives up their right to exclude police from 
their property to permit a search.73   In theory, the property owner retains 
control over the duration and scope of the search.74  Consent searches are 
permissible on the grounds that citizens have the ability to waive their rights.  
Plain view describes a situation in which no search actually occurs.  When 
police are lawfully in a location in which they can plainly see and access 
evidence or contraband, and immediately recognize the property as such, they 
may seize the property.  In such circumstances, the property owner has simply 
been negligent in leaving the property in an area where police have access.75    
 There is another category of exceptions that arise from arrest or 
impoundment – search incident to arrest and inventory searches.  The Court 
has held it reasonable for police to search suspects and areas within their 
                                                     
73 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).  
74 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).  
75 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321.  Plain view searches do not have to be accidental or 
inadvertent.  Police simply must be in an area where they have lawful view and access to the 
evidence or contraband.  Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).  
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reach upon arrest in order to disarm them and preserve evidence. 76   The 
justifications are first, police safety, and second, a lack of reasonable privacy 
interest in evidence of a crime. 
A third category of warrant exceptions authorize searches of automobiles 
or persons’ bodies based on probable cause or suspicion.  Police may search 
any automobile and corresponding containers if they have probable cause – 
essentially a high degree of suspicion – that the vehicle contains contraband or 
evidence of a crime.77  Police may additionally stop and detain a person for an 
open-palmed pat down based on reasonable suspicion that they have been 
engaged in criminal activity, either in the past, currently, or in the near 
future.78  The level of suspicion necessary is less than probable cause – police 
must be able to articulate a reason to justify the pat down.  These are called 
Terry searches, after the Supreme Court case which authorized their use.  
There is another catch-all warrant exception called “exigent 
circumstances.”  This exception allows the government to enter homes or other 
private buildings because of pressing need.   For example, firefighters and 
associated police may enter a burning building without a warrant to fight a fire 
or render aid to inhabitants that they believe to be injured.79  The Supreme 
Court also considers it reasonable to allow police to chase a suspected criminal 
                                                     
76 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969).  
77 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) justifies automobile searches based on 
being readily mobile.  There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in automobiles because 
they are subject to pervasive state and federal regulation.  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 
(1991) justifies searches of containers within automobiles.  
78 Terry v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 1 (1968).  
79 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).  This is called ‘emergency aid’ 
doctrine.  
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into a private building without a warrant because criminals could either escape 
or take hostages simply by entering private property.80   
Finally, there is a special category of suspicion-less searches based on 
special government needs.81  The most common form of special needs searches 
are drug tests at schools or sobriety checkpoints on highways.  Special needs 
searches do not require any suspicion of criminal activity.  The justification for 
such searches is that the search is minimal, whereas there is a strong 
government interest in prohibiting use of illegal drugs or driving while 
intoxicated.  If a special needs search becomes too invasive, or the government 
interest is minimal, then a warrant becomes necessary. 82   Special needs 
searches are unique among the warrant exceptions, because the Court departs 
from the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ analysis, introduced in Katz.   
  
                                                     
80 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). This is called the ‘hot pursuit’ 
doctrine.  
81 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).  
82 In Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).  In this case, the 
Court overturned a strip search of a middle school girl because the government did not have a 
strong enough interest in preventing her from using prescription ibuprofen.  
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III. Enforcement Mechanisms and Police Practice With a Focus on the 
New York-Northern New Jersey Metropolitan Area 
 
The United States judicial system provides several mechanisms by which 
defendants may challenge an illegal search and seizure.  These include, 
challenging the warrant upon which a search was based, the exclusion rule for 
illegally obtained evidence, and a limited federal abrogation of sovereign 
immunity against state police forces.  
A. Challenging Warrants:  The Circumstances Under Which 
Warrants May be Insufficient 
 
While warrant searches are presumptively reasonable, warrants may still 
be challenged.  The person subject to a warrant may challenge it if they can 
show that police supplied false information when seeking the warrant, either 
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the possibility that the information 
might be false.83  Of course, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to 
obtain strong enough evidence to prove to a court that police knowingly or 
recklessly lied to a judge in order to obtain a warrant.   
Warrants may also be challenged if they fail to describe with enough 
particularity the location to be searched or the evidence to be seized.  These 
standards are fairly generous.  For example, in Maryland v. Garrison, the 
Supreme Court upheld a warrant describing the top floor of an apartment 
building that had two units on that floor was upheld as being sufficiently 
                                                     
83 Virginia v. Moore, 533 U.S. 164 (2008).  Mere negligence on the part of the police is 
not enough.  A suspect must be able to show that police acted with some sort of volition when 
supplying false information to the issuing magistrate.  
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particular.84  And even though the police made a mistake by searching an 
innocent person’s apartment (which ended up containing illegal drugs) in 
addition to their intended target’s apartment, this accidental search was still 
valid.  And even a warrant authorizing search for “other fruits, 
instrumentalities, and evidence of crime at this time unknown” was sufficiently 
particular when the warrant at least specified the crime for which police were 
seeking evidence.85 
  A defendant may also challenge a warrant if it was not properly 
executed.  Police must comply with the limitations found in the warrant and 
may not search outside of the warrant’s scope.86  Finally, there is a general rule 
requiring police to knock at a door, announce their presence, and give a 
property owner time to open a door.  The purpose of this rule is to provide 
some limited privacy and property protection.87 
Under the above standards, it is generally difficult for defendants to 
successfully challenge a warrant as the particularity requirement is not very 
strong and since it is difficult for defendants to prove that police obtained or 
improperly executed a warrant.  A more common and generally more 
                                                     
84 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).  
85 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).  
86 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).  In this case, the court upheld a search 
technically outside the scope of the warrant due to an accidental police mistake.  If the police 
had purposefully acted outside of the warrant’s scope, the illegally obtained evidence could 
have been suppressible.   
87 There are multiple exceptions to this rule, including danger to police or risk of 
destroying evidence.  Failure to follow a knock and announce rule is not likely to result in 
suppression of evidence since the rule is intended to protect privacy and property – it does not 
affect the legitimacy of otherwise legally obtained evidence.  
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successful strategy is to challenge the process of the search itself in order to 
prevent evidence from being presented at trial.  
B. Exclusionary Rule:  Preventing Introduction of Evidence at 
Trial to Encourage Police Compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment 
 
Federal and State courts may choose to punish police for obtaining 
evidence illegally by excluding evidence from potential use at trial.88  Evidence 
is considered illegally obtained if police perform an unreasonable search or 
seizure.  Unreasonable searches are those that:  are done pursuant to an 
improperly obtained or improperly executed warrant, or are implemented 
without a warrant or relevant warrant exception.  In order to suppress illegally 
obtained evidence, a defendant must prove that they have standing to 
challenge the search.  A defendant can prove standing by showing that they 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched.  Generally, 
this amounts to establishing personal ownership of the property, since courts 
will generally hold that defendants do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in others’ property.89   
There are several exceptions to this rule that do limit its effectiveness.  If 
police would have inevitably discovered the same evidence legally, or similar 
evidence from an independent source legally, then a court will still admit the 
                                                     
88 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  The exclusionary rule was incorporated onto the 
states in this case.  The rule was first formally introduced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S> 
383 (1914).  
89 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).  
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evidence.90  For example:  in Nix v. Williams, police were transporting a known 
murderer between two cities to meet with his attorney.91  The officer driving the 
defendant, knowing that he was religious, remarked how it would be a shame 
that the child victim’s parents would never be able to find the body to give her 
a proper Christian burial.  The defendant felt guilty and directed the officer to 
the body’s location.  Typically, a court should suppress this information, since 
the officer deliberately elicited incriminating information from a man that the 
officer knew was represented by a lawyer, outside of the lawyer’s presence.  In 
this case, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the incriminating statement 
should still be admitted, since police were already searching in the immediate 
area of the body’s location and would have most likely found it even without 
the defendant’s help.   
One final limitation is that a police officer must commit the error in order 
for evidence to be suppressible.  For example:  if a judge makes an error in 
finding probable cause and police act on that error, using the warrant to 
conduct a search or arrest, any evidence obtained thereby will generally not be 
suppressed.  This is because the justification for excluding evidence is to 
punish police for violating the Fourth Amendment.  In a scenario where a judge 
erred in finding probable cause, the judge made the mistake – not the police – 
                                                     
90 For example, if police force a suspect to confess, leading them to evidence in an area 
that they were about to search anyway, the evidence is still admissible.   
91 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1981).  
David Cicotte 
dcicott@gmail.com 
34 
 
meaning that there would be no reason to punish the police by suppressing 
evidence.  92   
C. Civil Causes of Action:  State Liability for Police Violations of 
Citizens’ Civil Rights 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted in 1871 as part of the Civil Rights Act. As 
currently amended, it creates a civil cause of action against the state for 
violating the constitutional or other legal rights of any person within the United 
States.  In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court held that police could be acting 
“under color of any statute…” even when they were violating the law.  Thus, 
victims could bring a civil rights cause of action against the state, even when 
police act outside their authority.93   The Supreme Court expanded Section 
1983 to include municipalities in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the 
City of New York. 94   This meant that local government could be sued for 
damages based on official policy or governmental custom that deprived citizens 
of constitutional rights.  Section 1983 was again expanded in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics such that victims could 
obtain monetary damages for injuries inflicted by federal police while in the 
process of violating their Fourth Amendment rights.95   
                                                     
92 A person must have standing before they can challenge a search.  Standing is created 
by having a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or the property seized.  
Functionally, one must have ownership in order to have standing to challenge a search.  The 
logic goes that if a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object seized 
or place searched, then their Fourth Amendment rights could not have been violated under the 
Katz test.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).  
93 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).  
94 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) 
95 Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388, 
395-96 (1971).  
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In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff 
must allege that a person (according to Monell, person can include local 
government bodies) must act under color of law (in official capacity as a state 
government employee by virtue of the actor’s power as a state employee)  and 
subject or cause to be subjected (cause; note that there is no intent 
requirement) a deprivation of rights (rights protected by federal statute or the 
United States Constitution) and shall be liable…in action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress (The defendant may be sued in federal 
court).    
Section 1983 does not create respondeat superior liability against local 
government solely based on the actions of government employees.  The 
government employee must have been following some sort of government law or 
policy that suggested violation of constitutional rights in order for Section 1983 
to apply.96  It is therefore difficult, from a practical standpoint, to state a cause 
of action against a single rogue police officer.  And even when a victim is able to 
state a cause of action under Section 1983, it is often difficult for a victim to 
win either damages or injunctive relief in a Section 1983 suit at trial. 97  
                                                     
96 Id. at 691.  
97 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95.  In this case the Supreme Court held that 
in order to obtain injunctive relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must be able to establish real 
and immediate threat that they, personally, will be injured again by the policy at issue, that the 
conduct at issue is police policy, and that it is uniformly applied in all similar circumstances.   
In this case, the conduct at issue was a dangerous police choke hold.  See also Paul Hoffman, 
The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police 
Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1453, 1504-05 (1993).  The article investigates the 
difficulty of bringing Section 1983 claims given the absence of respondeat superior liability.  
Alleged misconduct must be proven to be a part of department policy or custom in order to give 
rise to civil liability.  
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Nevertheless, as seen in the following section, municipalities do sometimes 
settle when there appears to be sufficient risk of loss.98  An example of a local 
Section 1983 lawsuit follows.  
D. Allegations of Police Misconduct in Newark, New Jersey:  
Qualls v. City of Newark 
 
This local sample case illustrates the kinds of police abuses that are 
often alleged in violent, high-crime areas, and to investigate how municipalities 
subject to such pressures might respond.  The case was not taken to trial, so 
the facts alleged in the complaint were not proven in court.  Given the small 
damage settlement, the allegations below are probably exaggerated.  Even so, 
there may be some evidence supporting the claims – otherwise the plaintiff’s 
attorney would not have taken the case.99  The sheer volume of complaints and 
settlements between 2008 and 2010 cited in the ACLU study also suggest 
problems within the Newark Police Department.   
According to the complaint, the plaintiff, Sharonda Qualls, was been 
called to testify as a witness in the May 1999 trial of State of New Jersey v. 
Kareem Coleman at the Essex County courthouse.100  She intended to provide 
information that would confirm an alibi for the defendant in that case.  Ms. 
Qualls alleged that while she was waiting to testify outside the courtroom, 
Essex County Detective Kurt Swindell attempted to intimidate her.  The 
                                                     
98 Or when offering a settlement is less expensive than defending against a Section 1982 
claim.   
99 In the Matter of A Petition for An Investigation into the Newark, New Jersey Police 
Department by the United States Department of Justice Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141.   
100 All information below is taken from the following compliant:  Qualls v. City of 
Newark, Civil Action No. 2:01cv02860, District of New Jersey, 2003.  
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detective allegedly referred to the inhabitants of her apartment complex as 
“animals” and threatened to ‘come pay them a visit’ and “knock down some 
doors.”  On May 5, 1999, Ms. Qualls testified, providing defendant Kareem 
Coleman with an alibi.  On May 6, 1999, City of Newark Officer Willie Thomas 
obtained a search warrant for Ms. Qualls’ unit at the Bradley Court apartment 
complex in Newark.  On May 12, 1999, the Coleman jury was hung and the 
Court declared a mistrial.  On May 14, 1999, at 5:30 A.M., between ten to 
twenty law enforcement officers broke into Ms. Qualls’ apartment on the basis 
of the May 6, 1999 warrant.  Ms. Qualls alleged that the Newark Police failed to 
knock and announce their presence before battering down the apartment door, 
which was knocked off its hinges.  She also alleged that the warrant was stale 
and that the Newark Police searched beyond the defined scope of the 
warrant.101  She also suggested that police assaulted her twelve year old son, 
Lawrence, and handcuffed him to a chair.  Ms. Qualls was also then allegedly 
stripped searched and cavity searched by a female officer in the presence of 
multiple male officers.  After the incident, Lawrence was treated for injuries 
sustained during the incident at Newark Beth Israel.  As the police left, one 
was alleged to have stated “I bet you won’t go testify at the next trial.”   
Later on May 14, 1999, Ms. Qualls submitted a complaint with the 
Newark Police Department of Internal Affairs.  The department claimed no 
knowledge of the raid and would not give them a copy of the incident report.  
                                                     
101 The search warrant was to look for illegal Controlled Dangerous Substances (drugs).   
According to the complaint, the search was extensive and careless.  The police were alleged to 
have overturned most of the furniture and emptied out all possible containers.  She also 
alleged that they stole money and property.   
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The department did not return any further calls.  She then proceeded to 
complain to the city government.  At a meeting in the mayor’s office, Internal 
Affairs claimed to have no record of her May 14 visit.  Internal affairs refused to 
take the case, so Ms. Qualls sought independent legal help, which in turn led 
to the filing of a civil suit against the City of Newark in 2001.   
Ms. Qualls alleged that the May 6, 1999 warrant to search her apartment 
had been obtained using false and misleading information and that without 
such information the warrant could not have been issued.  She charges that 
the search was part of a conspiracy amongst certain Essex County detectives 
and Newark Police to punish her for testifying and providing a defendant with 
an alibi in the above criminal case.  Ms. Qualls was never charged with 
committing a crime.102  
On June 2, 2010, Newark reached a settlement with Ms. Qualls, whereby 
it passed a statute that paid her a sum of $35,000 in damages.103   
Because of this case and others like it, the American Civil Liberties Union 
petitioned the United States Department of Justice to conduct an external 
investigation of the Newark Police Department for constitutional rights 
violations.104  The petition noted four hundred and seven (407) allegations of 
                                                     
102 Petition, at 26, In the Matter of A Petition for An Investigation into the Newark, New 
Jersey Police Department by the United States Department of Justice Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
14141, 2011.)  
103 Newark, N.J. Resolution 10-0768 (2010).  In the Stipulation of Settlement, the 
Newark explicitly disclaims any liability. Since this case was not taken to court, all that the 
settlement proves is that the Newark government preferred to pay a settlement of $35,000 
rather than take the case to trial.   
104 See Petition, supra at note 93.  According to the American Civil Liberties Union of 
New Jersey, the Department of Justice granted their petition and began investigating the 
practices of the Newark Police Department on May 9, 2011, for constitutional rights violations.  
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Newark Police Department over a period of two and a half years between 2008 
and 2010, which resulted in thirty eight settlements with a value in excess of 
$4,700,000.105  The Justice Department granted the petition and began an 
investigation on May 9, 2011.106   The volume of complaints, lawsuits, and 
successful settlements suggest some truth to allegations of police misconduct 
in Newark.  Nevertheless, not only are some victims able to obtain 
compensation for having their rights violated, but the Federal Government is 
willing to investigate and fix the problems in the Newark Police Department.   
E. New Jersey State Police:  Substantial Compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment 
 
It is difficult to make generalizations about American Police compliance 
with the Constitution, given the large number of police departments across the 
country and their differing situations.  Internal reports from the New Jersey 
State Police suggest that they are at near full compliance with state law and 
that traffic stops are subject to three levels of supervisory review in order to 
ensure compliance, which include review of audio and video recording 
equipment installed in every police car.107  In 2011, the New Jersey State Police 
were subject to 591 misconduct allegations, 238 of which proceeded as cases 
and 146 of which were closed.108  All allegations were investigated, and roughly 
                                                                                                                                                                           
American Civil Liberties Union, Petition to Investigate the Newark Police Department (Oct. 21, 
2013 at 5:01 PM), http://www.aclu-nj.org/legaldocket/petitiontoinvestigatethene/.  
105 Id.  
106 Id.   
107 Seventeenth Progress / Status Summary of the Consent Decree Entered Into by the 
United States of America and the State of New Jersey Regarding the New Jersey Division of 
State Police, 39-40, 44.  
108 Office of Law Enforcement Professional Standards, First Public Aggregate Misconduct 
Report (February, 2013), 6. 
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35% were found to be unsubstantiated.109  Complaints were evenly distributed 
across the state. 110   Of closed misconduct cases, the largest category of 
infractions was for violations of administrative procedure or failure to follow 
police procedure (which can include everything from excessive force to simple 
attitude and demeanor).111  41 such cases were investigated and closed in 
2011, resulting in some sort of internal discipline.112  This was the first study 
of its type, so it is not possible to analyze statistical trends.  The New Jersey 
State troopers’ general compliance with the Constitution contrasts sharply with 
the anecdotal information given by the American Civil Liberties Union 
regarding Newark, which suggest widespread disregard for the law.  
  
                                                     
109 Id. at 13.  
110 Id. at 10. 
111 Id. at 14.  
112 Id. 
David Cicotte 
dcicott@gmail.com 
41 
 
Conclusion  
 
Both American and Saudi law place limits on searches and seizure.  The 
United States has done so by judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 
whereas Saudi Arabia has done so by royal decree and statute.  The two 
different schemes offer differing levels of protection, but both provide basic 
protections against arbitrary arrest and unreasonable property searches.  
Furthermore, it is clear that both American police and Saudi police are 
susceptible to abusing their power and committing misconduct.  Ultimately, 
the Fourth Amendment provides greater protection than the Saudi Basic Law 
and Criminal Procedure for three reasons:  culture, codified laws, and 
enforcement mechanisms.   
I. Differing Societies:  Privacy Concerns in America as Compared to 
Privacy in Saudi Arabia 
 
Islamic search and seizure rules suggest concerns similar to those 
behind the Fourth Amendment in the United States’ constitution – protection of 
property and persons from uninhibited intrusion.  Both ‘constitutions’ suggest 
some sort of privacy interest as well.  The American Supreme Court currently 
defines this privacy interest in terms reasonableness, whereby the 
reasonableness of searches is measured by social expectations.  Islamic law 
also appears concerned with privacy interests, but for reasons other than social 
expectations.  Breaches of search and seizure rules violate divine commands, 
and are thus considered sinful.  Judging from medieval jurisprudence, it does 
not appear that law enforcement was punished for violating religious rules.   
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Islamic search and seizure rules, as embodied in the Sharia, are based 
on underlying cultural concerns for modesty, personal reputation, and trust 
which are not protected under the United States Constitution.113  This makes 
sense when considering the religious basis for the law and underlying Arab 
culture that pre-existed the law.  Medieval Arabia was primarily tribal, with a 
handful of small towns scattered about – none numbering more than a few 
thousand inhabitants, except for Mecca during the pre-Muslim pilgrimages.114  
In such a society, business dealings with others were generally more personal 
than in the modern world.  This helps to explain the concerns over personal 
reputation.  No merchant would make a contract to buy goods from a 
merchant, nor would a tribal chieftain agree to guide a caravan across the 
desert if either were concerned about the honesty of Arab caravan organizers.   
Muslim concern over modesty was also extreme.  For example:  children 
and slaves were required to ask permission before reentering their households 
in the mornings or following the afternoon rest because they might see their 
parents or owners undressed or in their undergarments. 115   This same 
reasoning carries over to the commandments not to enter or spy.  The concern 
was not so much about personal property rights, but over citizen-police viewing 
people doing something private.  
                                                     
113 The Supreme Court held explicitly in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) that 
there is no constitutional interest in reputation.  
114 The Kaba shrine in Mecca and accompanying pilgrimages were originally pagan in 
nature and predate Islam by at least a century.  
115 Quran 24:58-59.  
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Given differing concerns, Islamic and American law offer somewhat 
different protections.  While both types of law theoretically forbid police entry 
into private homes, only Islamic law prohibits police from engaging in covert 
surveillance.  And while both American and Muslim religious police may stop 
and arrest if they come across a crime in progress, American police may utilize 
proactive investigation and warrants to make arrests in order to prevent future 
crimes from occurring.   
The American Concern’s current Fourth Amendment test, which 
measures socially recognizable expectations of privacy may reflect the 
underlying values of society to some extent, at least in the test itself.  It 
arguably does not, however, reflect American cultural values in how it is 
applied.  The Supreme Court has used the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test to allow everything from telephone and utility record searches to aerial 
surveillance of suburban back yards.  Such allowances do not match up with 
social expectations.116  On the other hand, however - while no one wishes to be 
observed by law enforcement through invasive techniques, society at the same 
time has not launched massive protests at Congress to pass statutes that 
would provide for more protection.  This may mean that Americans either (1) 
cannot be bothered, or (2), that Americans, despite their concerns over lost 
privacy, value the added security against crime that is provided by proactive 
and invasive law enforcement investigatory procedures.   It is difficult to make 
a definitive statement either way, since the Supreme Court is removed from 
                                                     
116 The mere fact that the average homeowner does fence their yard, but does not cover 
it with a tarp suggests that they desire privacy, but do not expect to be viewed from the air.   
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and unaccountable to society.  This is not to say that the Justices are 
unconcerned with how their rulings may affect society.  Rather, the justices 
may just not understand the American people.  
Saudi law does, despite suggestions in the Basic Law to the contrary, 
differ somewhat from the ideals espoused in theoretical religious law.  The 
Basic Law and sample case show that all levels of Saudi police conduct 
proactive investigations to seek out crime.  And, once found, they are able to 
conduct raids to arrest criminals and seize evidence.  This type of conduct, in 
and of itself, should be expected from any law enforcement in the modern 
world, even if it does contradict Sharia teachings.  Sharia treats offenses as 
either personal or against God – it does not have a concept of offenses against 
the state.  The modern Saudi state could not function if it relied solely on 
Sharia because many modern offenses, such as embezzling money did not exist 
during the middle-ages.  Furthermore, if the Saudi state were not allowed to 
proactively investigate crime, as required by sharia law, more crime would 
occur and more citizens would be victimized.  This is not to mean that the 
cultural concerns over modesty have disappeared.  If anything, the current law, 
which drives women to cover themselves from head to toe and stay inside at 
most times shows that such privacy concerns have intensified over the 
intervening centuries.  Rather, the Saudi monarchy’s interest in enforcing laws 
and maintaining public overcome the ordinary citizen’s interest in modesty and 
privacy.   
 
David Cicotte 
dcicott@gmail.com 
45 
 
II. Codified Laws Provide Predictability 
Codified laws are also important, since they inform all parties to a 
criminal suit what actions are a crime, what the state must do to prove guilt, 
and how the state is allowed to treat a defendant during arrest, investigation, 
and trial.   Having an established set of rules that is known to all parties can 
prevent multiple abuses.  If police can only arrest for specific activity, then it 
becomes much more difficult for police to arbitrarily arrest political dissidents 
or other unpopular minorities along general grounds of preserving public 
order.117   
As things stand now, Saudi citizens cannot know what all conduct, 
besides obvious crimes like theft or assault, could lead to arrest.   Of course, 
the same thing can also be said of U.S. citizens – the federal penal code alone, 
18 U.S.C., has over six thousand sections.  While most people in the United 
States may not be aware of the intricacies of criminal law, criminal defense 
attorneys, along with law enforcement and the court system most certainly are.  
United States law enforcement must justify arrests by showing probable cause 
of a statutory violation.  And United States courts can only convict a defendant 
if the state proves that the defendant committed every element of a crime, as 
enumerated in the statute.  Most metropolitan areas in the United States have 
so much crime that prosecutors must choose cases in which they will press 
charges.  Prosecutors are unlikely to charge a defendant when there is little or 
                                                     
117 Perhaps one of the reasons that the monarchy has not codified more of its criminal 
law is that it prefers that police have the flexibility to arrest political dissidents without having 
to come up with a better pretext than being publicly disruptive.  
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no evidence that the suspect committed each element of the crime for which 
police arrested him.  This contrasts with Saudi Arabia, where prosecutors, who 
do not have to prove elements of criminal statutes, can call any potentially 
disruptive behavior criminal, and essentially create an offense that matches the 
suspect’s conduct.  
III. Enforcement Mechanisms Help to Prevent Police Misconduct 
 
Finally, codifying the Sharia would be meaningless without proper 
enforcement mechanisms.  The Haia regularly violates existing written laws, 
engaging in raids without warrants, beating suspects while in custody, and 
engaging in dangerous high speed automobile chases.  Most complaints are 
made against the Haia and the Mabahith, rather than the regular police force.  
The Haia act without warrants, beat suspects, engage in dangerous activity, 
and act as much as a vigilante group as law enforcement.  Complaints against 
the Mabahith, on the other hand, surround prison abuses.  Prisoners allege 
that they are not informed of their charges, are refused attorneys, and are even 
held past the duration of their sentences.   A large proportion of such 
complaints are from foreigners, which may suggest that the legal system is 
biased against non-citizens.  There do not appear to be any major allegations 
regarding abuse by the regular police force.  Whether this is because the 
regular police follow the rules or because complaints do not make it to foreign 
media is not clear.   
Furthermore, the courts themselves are either unfamiliar with or actively 
ignore criminal procedure rights.  Saudi Arabia does not have an existing 
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framework similar to the exclusion rule, civil rights suits against the 
government, or even internal affairs offices tasked with disciplining police 
misconduct.  The Saudi judicial system and law enforcement agencies will 
likely continue to ignore the criminal procedure and any statutory rights 
introduced in the future unless the Saudi monarchy establishes internal 
enforcement mechanisms that create negative consequences for police and 
judges who violate or ignore the law.  
The situation is different in the United States.  State and federal 
governments have established mechanisms for holding police accountable, 
such as regular internal review of police actions, administrative discipline of 
police, the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence, and waiver of state 
immunity for civil rights violations.  This is not to say that abuse does not 
occur, or that it is a simple task for an American to prevail upon a suppression 
motion or civil rights suit.  Furthermore, as Ms. Qualls’s case showed, victims 
often allege internal affairs units try to cover up the wrongdoing.  If true, this 
means that existing enforcement mechanisms may be inadequate where those 
in charge of disciplining police are unwilling to do so.  It is difficult to make any 
kind of definitive statement about the country, because regions can differ 
widely and because few empirical studies regarding police misconduct exist.  If 
the New Jersey State Police report is indicative of the rest of the country, 
however, only about five percent of police face allegations of misconduct, and 
only around five percent of those allegations involve serious infringement upon 
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constitutional rights.  For this one law enforcement agency, at least, existing 
enforcement mechanisms appear effective.   
As the Huraisi case showed, the Saudi government is currently flirting 
with the idea of police discipline by allowing criminal prosecution of Haia 
officers who killed a suspect in their custody.  As the case also showed, the 
judicial system responded by acquitting all the religious police, leaving only a 
private volunteer to face trial.  Until the Saudi government forces its courts to 
take such trials seriously, and until it establishes and enforces disciplinary 
procedures against the Haia and Mabahith, civil rights abuses will continue.  
 
 
 
